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Preface 
 
 
 
The 2001 Everything But Arms amendment and ongoing trade negotiations under the 
WTO Doha Development Round have further raised attention for issues of market access 
of products from the 'South' to the high-income markets of 'the Quad' (European Union, 
United States, Canada and Japan). This review report draws on a body of existing literature 
to assess the impact of trade preferences on trade and welfare in developing countries. This 
study is one in a series on agricultural trade policy and developing countries that LEI has 
prepared on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisher-
ies under the programme 404 (International Co-operation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
The 2001 Everything But Arms initiative and ongoing trade negotiations under the WTO 
Doha Development Round have further raised attention for issues of market access of 
products from the 'South' to the high-income markets of 'the Quad' (European Union, 
United States, Canada and Japan). This report provides an overview of the European 
schemes of trade preferences to low-income and middle-income countries. It draws on ex-
isting literature to address the following research questions: (i) What EU preference 
scheme applies to which country and to which product, and under what conditions? (ii) 
What incentives for global resource allocation follow from north-south preferential trade 
agreements for agricultural products, short-term and on the long run? What is the impact of 
preference erosion? 
 It is argued that the Everything But Arms (EBA) amendment to the EU preference 
scheme will have limited effect on export potential and welfare in the least developed 
countries (LDCs). Before EBA, almost 100 percent of LDC products were covered under 
alternative preference schemes, but utilisation of the preferences was quite low. As the 
amendment does little to simplify rules of origin and cumulation of value added, utilisation 
is not likely to rise. The EU would do well to simplify compliance with their rules of ori-
gin. 
 If all countries in the Quad remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to LDCs, these coun-
tries gain access to market segments in Quad that were effectively barred before. The 
weight of LDCs in global trade, is however too small for substantial producer losses in the 
Quad and other developing countries. 
 When LDCs are granted deeper preferences under continued domestic agricultural 
policies in the Quad, resources in LDCs will move towards the agricultural sector. The re-
turn to these short-term rents depends heavily on the investment spending of these rents. 
On the long run, the rents will decrease as domestic agricultural policies in the Quad are 
cut back, as MFN tariffs decrease under further trade liberalisation, and as zero-tariff pref-
erences are extended to peer developing countries. The studies reviewed in this report 
agree that, for LDCs, the trade diverting impact of extending preferences to non-LDCs is 
quite small; the negative effect of MFN tariff reductions is stronger. If MFN tariffs and ag-
ricultural support in the Quad are reduced, it becomes necessary for LDCs that peer 
developing countries reduce tariff barriers too. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
In 2001, the European Council granted, albeit with important exceptions, unrestricted ac-
cess at zero tariff duty of products from least developed countries (LDCs) to the EU 
market. Trade negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Round have further raised 
attention for issues of market access of products from the 'South' to the high-income mar-
kets of 'the Quad' (European Union, United States, Canada and Japan). This report 
provides an overview of the European schemes of trade preferences to low-income and 
middle-income countries. The research questions to be addressed are: 
- developing and least developed countries' share of agricultural imports into EU is 
governed by the Generalised System of Preferences, the Cotonou Agreement, and the 
Everything But Arms amendment to the GSP scheme. What scheme applies to which 
country and to which product, and under what conditions? 
- what incentives for global resource allocation follow from north-south preferential 
trade agreements for agricultural products, short-term and on the long run? What is 
the impact of preference erosion in case of ongoing multilateral tariff reduction? 
Should we expect benefits or costs from trade creation and trade diversion? 
 
 The report is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a basic introduction to the 
economics of preferential trade. Chapter 3 provides a brief historic overview of trade pref-
erences, from the early years of GATT to the schemes that were introduced in the last 
couple of years. Chapter 4 discusses in detail three main preferential trade arrangements 
that govern developing countries' exports to the EU. Chapter 5 analyses potential trade 
gains for the least developed countries from the EBA initiative by matching data on trade 
preferences with LDC market shares in EU trade. Chapter 6 analyses the simulation results 
in three recent studies from the World Bank and UNCTAD on the effects of trade prefer-
ences for world trade and welfare. Also, it provides a summary on the impact of EBA. 
Chapter 7 concludes. Various boxes feature examples on discussions in the main text. 
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2. The economics of preferential trade 
 
 
 
This chapter provides a basic introduction to the economics of preferential trade. Below the 
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion are introduced, terms often used to describe 
the impact of preferences on trade and welfare. When trade preferences are granted to a se-
lection of (potential) foreign producers, there is a primary impact on trade flows in the 
preferred good, a secondary impact on substitutes and complements, and a tertiary impact 
following readjustment of the balance of payments (Pomfret, 1997, p.183). The discussion 
in this report is confined to the primary and secondary impact. Following the theoretical 
discussion, the chapter closes with a note on applied analysis. 
 
 
2.1 Welfare effects 
 
Imagine a world consisting of just three countries in which just a single good is produced 
and consumed. Country A imports that good and charges the same tariff, whether the prod-
ucts originate from country B or country C. It just so happens that production of the good 
is more costly in country B than in country C, so that the producers in C can offer the good 
to the consumers in A at a price below that of country B producers. Initially, then, country 
A imports products only from country C. If country A now decides to grant trade prefer-
ences to either country B or C - that is, to reduce the tariffs for products more from the one 
country than for the other - several trade effects may occur. The effects on trade flows in 
the goods concerned can be summarised in the notions of created and diverted trade. 
- Trade creation occurs when reduced tariffs or quota encourage trade, allowing im-
ports to displace less efficient local production and/or to expand consumption 
(McCulloch et al., 2001). In terms of our 3-country example: trade creation occurs 
when following a tariff reduction for products from low-cost producer C, consumers 
in country A substitute local products for those from country C. The more price-
sensitive is import demand, the more impact preferential trade has on country A. 
- Trade diversion occurs when a trade reform discriminates between different trading 
partners and results in a higher cost source displacing a lower cost source 
(McCulloch et al., 2001). In terms of the trade between countries A, B and C: trade 
diversion occurs when goods from country B are charged a lower tariff than goods 
from country C, resulting in the replacement of imports from C by imports from 
country B. Then, the preference to country B implies an incentive for inefficient pro-
duction patterns in the world. 
 
 In the scenario where goods from high-cost producer B receive trade preferences 
over those from low-cost producer C on the market of country A, the welfare effects are 
composed of changes in: 
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- producer surplus in (high-cost) country B (PSb); 
- consumer surplus in importing country (CSa); 
- producer surplus in importing country (PSa); 
- tariff revenue in importing country (tariff payments for exporting country) (TRa); 
- producer surplus in the (low-cost) country C (PSc). 
 
 See Appendix D for a graphical demonstration; here, these effects are clarified along 
the lines of a basic equation. Suppose that preferential access increases imports from the 
beneficiary country at the expense of domestic products. Then, the basic welfare impact of 
preferential trade to the world (W) is: 
 
 W = ∆CSa – ∆TRa – ∆PSa + ∆PSb + ∆ PSc (1) 
 
 In the beneficiary countries, welfare increases from the arrangement: exporters save 
tariff duties and perhaps increase the volume of exports at prices possibly well-above 
world market prices, ∆PSb>0.1 The welfare effect for the importing country is ambiguous. 
The importing country will lose tariff revenue as imports from the beneficiary country en-
ter at reduced or zero tariff rates. There is trade creation; so domestic producers will lose 
from the arrangement and their surplus, ∆PSa<0. Consumers gain from lower prices, hence 
consumer surplus increases, ∆CSa>0. In sum, tariff revenues decrease, producers loose 
part of their rents to producers elsewhere, and consumers benefit from lower sales prices. 
The net result depends on whether consumer gains from the price reduction make up for 
the producer and revenue losses. 
 Equation 1 includes producer effects in 'third' country C, PSc. Imports from the fa-
voured country may displace imports from third countries and reduce producer surplus in 
country C (∆PSc<0). In terms of global welfare, the impact relates to the global allocation 
of resources: consumers may end up buying the less efficiently produced good of the two. 
This inefficiency is crucial to the trade diversion effect, which is a major welfare caveat to 
discriminatory trade relations, as it implies a loss of global welfare and consumer surplus.
 While the beneficiary country will definitely gain from the trade diverting arrange-
ment, the third country certainly looses, and the total effect on the importing country is 
uncertain. Hence, total impact on world welfare is ambiguous.2 A full assessment of the 
impact of the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative on world welfare should include trade 
and welfare effects of all countries. Due to the minor share of the LDC trade in world 
trade, producer losses due to displaced trade in the EU and in non-LDC developing coun-
tries are likely to be small in general. 
                                                     
1 The rents accrue to producers in the exporting country that receives the preference, unless they are some-
how taxed. Ways for Governments in beneficiary countries to capture some of these rents include export tax 
and a system of export licenses. 
2 One relevant interpretation of equation 2 is that governments in developed countries choose to support the 
exporting sector in selected developing countries, in which sense trade preferences may be compared with 
other instruments for development assistance. Whether this practice is global welfare enhancing or not cannot 
be stated in advance. See Topp (2001) and Tangermann (2001) for a discussion. 
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2.2 Applied analysis: a comment about methods and outcome 
 
The results from applied analysis are quite sensitive to the extent to which products of al-
ternative origin (i.e. produced in the importing or 'donor' country, the beneficiary country 
or a third country) can substitute each other in trade. For a great deal of products, consum-
ers are not indifferent to the origin of the product, so that a product made in the one 
country is not a perfect substitute to a similar product made in the other country. The more 
easily products substitute each other in global markets, the stronger effects the introduction 
of trade preferences will have. Empirical studies emphasise - by assumption - either that 
products from favoured countries easily displace domestic products, or that favoured coun-
tries will replace third country products in the market. In general equilibrium models, such 
as those used by Bora et al. (2002), Ianchovichina et al. (2000) and Kerkelä et al. (2000), 
estimates of trade diversion pivot around Armington substitution elasticities and the sec-
toral composition of exports. Moreover, impact analysis by general equilibrium models, 
with their emphasis on factor costs and terms of trade effects, generally yield stronger trade 
diversion and weaker trade creation effects than analyses in a partial equilibrium setting, 
for example the model used by Hoekman et al. (2001). See chapter 6 for a discussion of 
empirical results. 
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3. History of preferential trade arrangements 
 
 
 
The period 1950-2000 
 
For decades, preferential access to developed countries has been an important part of inter-
national trade and development policies.1 Even during the early days of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, since 1995 continued in the WTO), trade prefer-
ences were widely accepted. Under the GATT regulation, trade preferences had to be non-
discriminatory, i.e. it was not allowed for imports from some countries to receive larger 
preferences than others. That would undercut one of the cornerstones of GATT; that each 
member receives preferences similar to that of the nation most favoured before GATT. 
Hence Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs became normal GATT tariffs. In the late '50s, 
early '60s the European Community undermined the principle of non-discrimination. In the 
Rome Treaty, it is stated that (former) colonies of European Community states should have 
duty-free access to the entire Community market. Although this was clearly an act of dis-
crimination towards other trading partners, the Community took the position that these 
agreements were non-negotiable. The United States did not object to the agreements, and 
GATT adopted them. In the Kennedy Round (1965) discriminatory policies were allowed, 
but only if they concerned trade preferences for less-developed countries. 
 In the early 1970s most developed countries, including the European Community, 
designed a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The general idea of these GSP 
schemes was to promote export and industrialisation in developing countries, by granting 
them preferential access to the internal markets of developed countries. Today, the GSP 
scheme of the European Union comprises of 179 countries, which receive some trade pref-
erences. 
 Next to the GSP scheme, the European Community designed discriminatory prefer-
ential trading schemes for a sub-set of GSP countries. In 1975, it signed the Lomé 
Convention with a set of 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 'Lomé' meant 
to enhance and narrow down trade preferences: it covered more product groups; trade pref-
erences were 'deeper', i.e. preference margins were larger than under GSP; and it generally 
focused on the less developed countries and former colonies. These countries were granted 
further reduced tariffs or even duty free access on numerous export products. At first 
glance the Lomé Convention seemed to offer much to the ACP countries. However, for 
several reasons the system was not that generous. First, most tariff reductions were concen-
trated on products with a low initial tariff and products that were not exported by most 
ACP-countries. Second, the arrangement excluded most agricultural products covered by 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Sugar might be considered an exception to this, as 
17 ACP countries (plus India) were granted special quota for sugar under the Special Pref-
                                                     
1 See Pomfret (1997) for a more elaborate historical overview. 
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erential Sugar arrangement. This arrangement has been of great value to the few participat-
ing ACP-countries, which include four Least Developed Countries. Third, although 
manufacturing products received larger preference margins, they were restricted by several 
costly rules, such as the rules of origin. These imply that the base material for some prod-
ucts should be local and that there should be 50-60% local value added. Furthermore, the 
product had to undergo two stages of production in the ACP-country. Since most ACP 
countries were hardly industrialised it was virtually impossible for them to comply with 
these rules. Fourth, tariffs on processed products, such as canned fish, were much higher 
than the tariffs on the unprocessed product, i.e. raw fish. A tariff structure like this, also 
known as tariff escalation, obviously, does not promote industrialisation. See Box 1 for an 
example of such a tariff structure for cacao. Fifth, the European Community restricted the 
volume of trade that could benefit from reduces tariffs by introducing tariff rate quotas on 
nearly all products. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) imply a two-tiered tariff: an in-quota tariff 
(the lower tariff) combined with a volume constraint, and an out-quota tariff (the higher 
tariff) that applies for all trade that exceeds the volume restriction. These TRQs effectively 
limited the increase in exports from ACP countries. 
 It is obvious that the limited range of agricultural products covered by the preference 
schemes, the strict value-added requirements, the quantity restrictions and tariff escalation 
schemes did not support the initial objectives of export promotion and industrialisation. 
 
The period 2000-2003 
 
The Lomé Convention was reviewed at the end of the 1990s and replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2000. Most of the differences are of a political nature, e.g. more emphasis on 
good governance, democratic principles, human rights and social development. In order to 
boost economic performance the Cotonou Agreement focuses even more on (regional) de-
velopment projects, such as infrastructure. Furthermore, special funds from the EU to 
promote social and economic development are subjected to less rigid allocation systems, 
i.e. they can be adapted to the specific institutional context of the beneficiary country. 
Trade policies, however, are hardly affected by the Cotonou Agreement. 
 For the group of least developed countries (LDCs), the EU has specific preference 
schemes in place that are technically part of the GSP scheme. In March 2001, the GSP 
LDC scheme was replaced by the well-received Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. 
The EBA initiative grants 49 of the Least Developed Countries duty-free access to the EU-
market for all products, except arms. Also, EBA slightly changes the conditions on rules of 
origin for LDCs. Initially three 'sensitive' products are excluded from EBA: bananas, rice 
and sugar. Tariff rates for these products will gradually be reduced and abolished by 2006 
(bananas) and 2009 (rice and sugar). 
 Although the EBA initiative is highly praised by the international community, the 
question rises how much the EBA initiative will bring to the LDCs over the substantial 
preferences under GSP and ACP. In the following, it is argued that EBA does little to solve 
important constraints for LDC exports to the EU that currently prevail. 
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Box 3.1 Tariff escalation case: cacao 
1 Source: Trade and Environment Database. 
Cacao is one of several sectors faced with a tariff escalation scheme. Cacao and cacao preparations are an
important export product for developing countries, for some of vital importance even. For example Indo-
nesia is the third exporter of cacao beans in the world (see Appendix C, table c), making it one of its most
important agricultural export products. 1 
 Although tariff lines and regulations for cacao are relatively simple and clear cut, the EU tariff
structure of cacao is a perfect example of tariff escalation. As already mentioned in the text, tariff escala-
tion refers to a tariff structure with increasing tariff rates as the stage of processing increases. Table 1
shows the tariff structure for cacao and cacao related products. To products from Indonesia, GSP rates
apply. The scheme clearly shows that Indonesia's preference margin on the MFN rate decreases with the
stage of processing.  
 
 
Table 1 Tariff rates under the GSP scheme of the EU 
 
 
1999-2001 in % MFN rate GSP preference margin GSP rate 
 
 
Cacao beans 3 100 0 
Cacao powder 16 85 5,6 
Cacao paste, etc. 15 30 10,5 
Chocolate, etc. > 2kg 22,3 30 15,6 
Chocolate, etc. < 2kg 10 15 8,5 
 
 
Note: Data are calculated from the AMAD database. 
 
 
 Nearly half of all cacao beans exported by developing countries go to the European Union, yet a
mere 4.913 tonnes of chocolate products from these countries were shipped to the EU in 1996 (the EU it-
self produced over 3 million tonnes 1). One reason for the distorted trade relation between the EU and
cacao exporting countries is the tariff structure as presented above.  
 The tariff escalation forces developing countries to produce cacao preparations at much lower cost
than the EU in order to be competitive with EU producers. Producing at such low costs is almost impossi-
ble for developing countries, hence, investing in processing industries is hardly profitable. The result of
the tariff escalation on cacao products is that investment in the processing industries is low, hampering
development of these industries. The EU tariff scheme on cocoa is an impediment to development of co-
coa processing activities in Indonesia.  
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4. EU trade preferences for agricultural products from  
 developing countries 
 
 
In the previous section, several preferential trade arrangements have been briefly ad-
dressed. This section discusses in more detail the most important agreements regarding 
trade between the European Union (EU) and developing countries: the Generalized System 
of Preferences, the Cotonou Agreement and the Everything But Arms initiative. The dis-
cussion of the schemes follows a similar structure by addressing the objective; the tariff 
scheme; the impact of the scheme on seasonal duties; and safeguards and reasons for ex-
clusion and rules of origin. 
 
 
4.1 Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
 
Objective 
 
The objective of the GSP scheme as formulated by the EU is as follows: 
 
The Community's common commercial policy must be consistent with and consoli-
date the objectives of development policy, in particular the eradication of poverty 
and the promotion of sustainable development in the developing countries. (Euro-
pean Commission, 2001b) 
 
 All countries classified as developing countries are eligible to preferential access for 
their products to the EU market.1 The arrangement affects several major trade partners of 
the EU such Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Russian 
Federation, Taiwan, Thailand and Ukraine. The Generalised System of Preferences grants 
preference margins according to the level of protection on the internal market: on sensitive 
products MFN-tariffs are reduced by 3.5%, non-sensitive products receive 100% prefer-
ence margin. GSP preferences account for all goods, but several agricultural goods are 
excluded. Moreover, a large number of bilateral agreements between EU and GSP partners 
undercut the GSP scheme. The latest GSP regulation extends the programme to 2004, and 
includes the Everything But Arms initiative for LDCs. 
 
Tariff scheme 
 
In the GSP scheme most products are charged a combination of two tariff types. Tariff cuts 
are granted on imported products that originate from GSP countries. The actual tariff cut 
                                                     
1 The European Union follows the World Bank classification. 
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(i.e. the preference margin) depends on a classification of products into sensitive and non-
sensitive products.1 The main elements of the 2002-2004 GSP scheme are: 
- for non-sensitive products, duties are completely suspended; 
- for sensitive products, ad-valorem tariffs are cut by 3.5 percentage points, while spe-
cific tariffs should be reduced by 30%; 
- several agricultural products in the non-sensitive category do not benefit from the 
100% preference margin. 
 
 There are several more exceptions to the general scheme. First, if the previous GSP 
scheme grants a higher preference than the current scheme, the previous preference mar-
gins continue to apply after January 1st 2002. Second, exceptions apply to specific 
products. For example, according to the AMAD database, ethyl alcohol has the specific 
tariff cut by 15%. Third, some countries are excluded for selected fishing products and iron 
and steel products.2 Although there are more exceptions, they do not apply to agricultural 
products. In the GSP scheme, quite a lot of agricultural products do not receive any prefer-
ential trading; these are levied the higher MFN tariffs. On average, the EU GSP 
programme reduces trade barriers by half (Hoekman et al., 2001, p.10). 
 
Seasonal duties 
 
Most countries pose seasonal duties in order to protect domestic producers against lower 
priced foreign products during the harvest and selling period. Although little is mentioned 
in the EU preferential regulations, the EU does pose seasonal duties on several products 
originating from GSP countries. According to the AMAD database, 22 horticultural and 
fruit products face an import duty during a given part of the year.3 During these periods ad-
valorem duties of around 20% and specific duties of well over a 100 ECU per tonne are not 
uncommon. For instance, grapes face an ad-valorem duty of 22% and a specific duty of 
120 ECU per tonne from July 21 to October 31. See box 4.1 for an example on apples. 
Seasonal duties are not mentioned in preference schemes; hence these tariffs apply to all 
exporting countries, with the positive exception of the EBA beneficiaries, who are granted 
complete duty free access. 
 
Safeguards and exclusion from GSP 
 
In order to protect its own producers a safeguard is adopted in the GSP regulation, which is 
the same as the GATT safeguard. The GSP tariff scheme can be suspended if the imports 
                                                     
1 Before 2001, GSP schemes distinguished between four categories of sensitivity: non-sensitive, semi-
sensitive, sensitive and very sensitive. The latest scheme, for the years 2002 to 2004, mentions only two. It is 
unclear whether the categories semi-sensitive and very sensitive continue to be applied. 
2 These countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Greenland, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and South Africa. 
3 Vegetables: Cucumbers, Potatoes, Tomatoes, Cauliflowers, Cabbage lettuce, Celeriac, Peas, Beans, Arti-
chokes. Fruits: Avocados, Oranges, Mandarins, Grapefruit, Grapes, Apples, Apricots, Cherries, Pears, 
Peaches, Plums, Strawberries, Kiwifruit. Tariff data obtained from the AMAD database. 
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from certain countries 'cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties to a Community Pro-
ducer'. 
 Next to the safeguard, the EU has adopted several rules to suspend preferential ar-
rangements for some or all products originating in a beneficiary country, in case of: 
- the use of slavery, forced or child labour; 
- serious and systematic violation of the freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining or the principle of non-discrimination in respect of employment and oc-
cupation; 
- export of goods made by prison labour; 
- failure of custom controls on export or transit of drugs and/or practices of money 
laundering in the beneficiary country; 
- fraud, irregularities or failure to comply with the rules of origin of products and/or 
the proof thereof; 
- unfair trading practices; 
- contravention of the rules concerning the conservation and management of fishery 
 resources; 
- a country exceeding a certain level of development; 
- a sector exceeding a certain level of development. 
 
 Breaking one of these rules may result in the reinstatement of the MFN tariffs for all 
or certain products originating in the beneficiary country. 
 
Rules of Origin 
 
The rules of origin are to determine whether a product or a certain part thereof is manufac-
tured in the beneficiary country or not. It prevents third countries from using the 
beneficiary country as a transit in order to obtain the reduced import tariff. The most im-
portant part of these rules is that processed products should have undergone sufficient 
processing in the beneficiary country. Manufactured goods are particularly affected by 
these rules of origin, but agricultural (processed) products face rules as well. 
 On unprocessed agricultural products, rules of origin concern whether a product is 
wholly obtained, whether it contains certain inputs or whether certain inputs make up a 
certain part of the price. Base products or materials, such as live animals, meat and trees, 
should be wholly obtained in the GSP country. Still, there are rules about whether a prod-
uct is wholly obtained in a country or not, especially with fish and fish related products. 
Rules of origin related to fishery practices are quite elaborate and appear difficult and 
costly to prove. 
 Processed products are subject to other, more complicated, rules. Virtually every ag-
ricultural commodity that has undergone some processing is subjected to rules of origin. 
Some products should/shouldn't or may/may not contain certain inputs, e.g. the manufac-
ture of bakers' ware (bread, biscuits, etc.) may not include imported inputs from chapter 11 
(products of the milling industry incl. flour). In this case, the beneficiary country should 
make all wheat, flour and bread. Another requirement states that several imported inputs 
may be used in the processing of an agricultural commodity provided that the input costs 
do not make up more than a certain share (30 or 70%) of the price. 
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Box 4.1 Seasonal duties case: apples  
 
 
4.2 The Cotonou Agreement 
 
Objective 
 
The Cotonou Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP) and the EU should promote 
 
'(…) the economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States, contributing 
to peace and security and promoting a stable and democratic political environment.' 
(European Commission, 2000b) 
The EU poses tariffs on apples year throughout the year. Because they differ considerably by season,
these tariffs are considered to be seasonal duties. Table 2 presents these seasonal duties. EU customs
not only levy the seasonal duty, but also enforce a minimum entry price for selected horticultural prod-
ucts. The entry price gives the minimum price under which products are allowed to enter the EU. On
top of this a custom tariff and a maximum tariff equivalent (MTE) are posed. The height of the MTE
changes with the height of the import price. Lower import prices, generally means a higher MTE
(MTEs given in the table are maxima). Most seasonal duties for fruit and vegetables are constructed this
way. As can be seen, total levy on outside-EU prices can amount to over 50% ad valorem. 
 
 
Table 2 EU entry price and customs tariffs in 2000 for apples 
 
 
Period Entry price Tariff rate MTE  
 (euro/tonne) (% ad valorem) (euro/tonne) 
 
 
01/08 – 31/12 457 9,0 238 
01/01 – 31/03 568 4,0 238 
01/04 – 30/06 568 3,0 238 
01/07 – 31/07 457 3,0 238 
 
 
Source: Van Berkum et al. (2002). 
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 Under the Cotonou Arrangement, successor to the 1975 Lomé Convention, over 70 
countries are granted preferential access to the EU market for selected goods.1 Over USD 8 
billion worth of agricultural goods were exported from ACP countries to the EU in 2000. 
 As can be seen from the objective, the Cotonou Agreement goes much further than a 
normal preferential trading scheme. The agreement not only promotes the export and pro-
duction sectors in the beneficiary countries it also supports the non-private sector, cultural 
activities and political (democratic) stability. Achieving this goal is not merely done by fi-
nancial support, but also by knowledge transfers to ensure a stable socio-economic and 
democratic environment. In short it is much more an agreement aiming for overall devel-
opment, than for trading preferences alone. 
 
Tariff scheme 
 
The tariff scheme under Cotonou is a myriad of preferences specific to countries and prod-
ucts. These are best described in relation to the GSP scheme. Since the Lomé Convention 
was signed in 1975, the EU has granted most ACP countries 'deeper' and 'wider' trade pref-
erences than under the GSP scheme. That is, for ACP countries, tariff cuts are larger and 
apply to a broader selection of products. Under the current Cotonou Agreement, most ad-
valorem tariffs are suspended and some specific tariffs have been lowered compared to 
GSP. Cotonou also covers more agricultural products than GSP, and can be said to actually 
increase access of agricultural products from beneficiary countries to the EU market. 
 
Seasonal duties 
 
The Cotonou Agreement makes no mention of any form of seasonal duties. However, sea-
sonal duties applied under the GSP scheme apply likewise to ACP countries. These could 
be a serious impediment to horticultural and fruit exports from the ACP region. 
                                                     
1 77 ACP countries are covered under the Cotonou Agreement, the following 76 are eligible for ACP trade 
preferences: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo 
(Kinshasa), Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eri-
trea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Fed-
eral States of Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. South Africa and Cuba 
are also ACP members. However, Cuba is no signatory to the Cotonou Agreement and South Africa has al-
ready concluded a Trade and Development Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. 
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Non-tariff barriers 
 
Although not explicitly mentioned in the former Lomé Convention or the Cotonou Agree-
ment, there are some Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) in the preferential trading agreement. For 
these tariff lines, there is an in-quota tariff and an out-of-quota tariff.1  
 
 
 
Box 4.2 EU tariff peaks under GSP and Cotonou 
 
 
Safeguards and exclusion from Cotonou 
 
The rules for suspension of (a part of) the preferential agreements are the same as for the 
GSP scheme, with one exception: preferences are not conditional on the level of develop-
ment in a beneficiary country or sector. 
                                                     
1 Most analytical studies cite a calculated tariff, after weighing in-quota and out-quota rates by the value of 
in-quota and out-quota trade. 
Preference schemes offered by EU to non-LDC developing countries often fail to address high MFN tariff
barriers on products of importance to their trade potential. To see this, we analyse here the impact of the
GSP and Cotonou preference scheme on 'peak tariffs' in the EU scheme. Tariff peaks refer to MFN tariff
lines above 15% ad valorem. In the US and Canada over 85% of tariff peaks is in industrial products
(mainly clothing and textile), agricultural products account for 91% of tariff peaks in EU and 77% in Ja-
pan.  
 EU tariff peaks are summarised in table 4.1, drawn from Hoekman et al. (2001). It shows the peak
MFN tariff and the prevailing preference margins for various categories (HS classification, 6-digit level)
of EU imports subject to tariff duties of 15% and more. Note that the leftmost column provides product
categories at the HS2 level, whereas the other columns refer only to the number of tariff lines ('products
definition') at HS6 level. 
 The table illustrates several issues. First, MFN agricultural tariffs in the EU are quite high on aver-
age. Where MFN tariffs are high, preference margins are generally low. Therefore, preferences offer little
protection against tariff peaks. Second, preferences for ACP countries are substantially more generous
than the GSP scheme. GSP preferences are not too generous except for coffee and tea, tobacco and foot-
wear. ACP countries 'compete' for the best preference. Third, ACP and GSP do not address heavy
protection by tariff peaks for meat, cereals and dairy and, to a lesser extent, sugar. 
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Table 4.1 Selected EU tariff peaks by country group and product 
 
 
Tariff Peak at HS 2-digit Products Coverage MFN tariff Preference margin (ratio) 
 # of 6-digit (%)  
 tariff-lines  GSP ACP LDC 
 
 
01 Live animals 7 38.2 0.00 0.30 0.06 
02 Meat and edible meat offal 41 71.0 0.00 0.10 0.08 
03 Fish & crustacean, mollusk nes 17 18.7 0.10 1.00 1.00 
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; honey 25 59.1 0.01 0.06 0.12 
06 Live tree & other plant; bulb, flowers 2 16.9 0.18 1.00 1.00 
07 Edible vegetables and roots & tubers 12 25.4 0.15 0.66 0.79 
08 Edible fruit and nuts; melons 8 20.2 0.12 0.64 0.66 
09 Coffee, tea, mat and spices 2 16.0 0.69 1.00 0.50 
10 Cereals 14 75.6 0.00 0.06 0.06 
11 Prod mill indust; malt; starches 31 38.2 0.02 0.20 0.17 
12 Oil seed, oleagi fruits; misc grain 1 74.4 0.00 0.16 0.15 
13 Lac; gums, resins & other veg 1 17.8 0.30 1.00 1.00 
15 Animal/veg fats & oils & prod 8 56.0 0.19 0.51 0.60 
16 Prep of meat, fish or mollusks 22 23.5 0.20 0.67 0.68 
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery 9 37.6 0.03 0.21 0.14 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 1 24.0 0.10 0.25 0.25 
19 Prep of cereal, flour, starch/milk prod 13 34.1 0.11 0.39 0.37 
20 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts prod 42 26.1 0.15 0.88 0.88 
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 8 19.2 0.28 0.78 0.95 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 12 35.7 0.33 0.77 0.71 
23 Residues & waste from food indust 6 71.4 0.03 0.11 0.06 
24 Tobacco and manufactured 8 56.2 0.39 1.00 1.00 
 
 
Reproduced from Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga, 2001, table A2. Notes:  
For the first three columns from the right, values presented are preference margins on the MFN tariff rate, i.e. 
a value of 1.00 implies 100 percent margin (zero duty), a value of 0.00 implies full MFN duty rate. 
All specific tariffs have been converted into ad valorem tariffs.  
GSP preferences reflect the 1999-2001 scheme (European Commission, 1998).  
ACP countries preferences are derived from the agreements of the Lomé IV Convention, not the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
 
 
4.3 Everything But Arms 
 
Objective 
 
The European Council decided to grant the least developed countries (LDCs) additional 
trade preferences 'in the light of the real risk of the LDCs becoming increasingly marginal-
ised in the world economy' (European Commission, 2001a). The initiative was formalised 
as an amendment to the GSP scheme of the EU, which entered into force by March 2001. 
Over USD 2.6 billion worth of agricultural goods were exported from LDC countries to the 
EU in 2000. 
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Tariff scheme 
 
As mentioned earlier, the everything But Arms (EBA) initiative grants duty-free access for 
all products except arms and ammunition to 49 of the world's poorest countries (see Ap-
pendix 1 for a list of countries). Three important agricultural products remain under 
protective rules access: bananas, rice and sugar. The tariffs on these products will gradu-
ally be reduced and completely abolished by 2009 in accordance with the following 
scheme: 
- Bananas: 20% annual reduction from January 2002 and complete liberalisation from 
2006. On January 2002, EU specific import tariff on bananas was 544 euro per 100 
kg for LDCs and 680 euro per 100 kg for other countries of origin (Bora et al. 2002); 
- Sugar: the liberalisation scheme implies a full phaseout of tariffs and quotas for 
sugar imports of LDC origin by 2009. Market access is increased in four steps, each 
to take place on July 1, resulting in 20% tariff reduction in 2006, 50% reduction in 
2007, 80% reduction in 2008 and full liberalisation on 1 July 2009. The effective EU 
import tariff (specific tariffs excluded) on sugar in 1998 differed between 75 and 103 
percent for all countries of origin (Bora et al., 2002); 
- Rice: market access for rice imports will be increased along a scheme similar to 
sugar, also leading up to full liberalisation by July 2009. The effective EU import tar-
iff (specific tariffs excluded) on paddy rice in 1998 was 61% for LDCs and 65% for 
all other countries of origin; processed rice imports were levied a 87% effective tar-
iff, irrespective of origin (Bora et al., 2002). 
 
Seasonal duties 
 
For LDC exporters, seasonal duties are waived. 
 
Non-tariff barriers 
 
Since all products eventually receive duty free access, there are no tariff rate quotas for 
LDC exports after 2009. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for bananas will remain effective until 
2006, TRQs for rice and sugar until 2009. These TRQs consist of a duty free contingent 
and a tariff for exports that exceed the quota. The contingent consists of a certain volume 
based upon the export volumes of recent years; every consecutive year the quota will be 
increased by fifteen percent. 
 
Safeguards and exclusion from EBA 
 
Since the Everything But Arms initiative is an extension of the GSP agreement, safeguards 
and rules for exclusion of the EBA are basically the same as for the GSP scheme. No coun-
try or sector has been excluded from the EBA or GSP, except Myanmar, for its serious and 
systematic violation of the Universal Human Rights. Myanmar can therefore only apply to 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff. 
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Rules of Origin 
 
The basic rules of origin under GSP have been adapted slightly under EBA. The most im-
portant change is the 'full cumulation system', which is aimed to provide an opening for 
LDCs to become an intermediary producer and exporter on the global market. Under this 
system, LDCs may process and re-export at zero-tariff products imported from the 
ASEAN, SAARC and EU region. The full cumulation condition is that the processing in 
the LDC adds 100% value to the product. That is a deviation from previous rules, which 
states that two stages of processing have to occur in the LDC itself. Rules of origin remain, 
however, complex obstacles to LDCs. 
 
 
Up to now we have discussed several preferential tariff schemes: GSP, Cotonou and EBA. Although it might 
seem that these schemes are very transparent and easy to find, they certainly are not. Several schemes overlap 
one another or other (bilateral) agreements, which means that you have to find out which country is subjected 
to which regulation for which product. Furthermore, most schemes are subject to continuous reforms: the 
GSP scheme of the EU is a point in case. The GSP scheme was developed in the early 70's and ever since, it 
has been adapted, reviewed and changed, with every modification referring to previous resolutions. Next to 
these general regulations, most schemes have exceptions for certain products or countries, which are being 
described in separate resolutions. These ongoing changes and exceptions make it quite difficult to find the 
right tariff preference and rules of origin for a certain product. 
 The listing of products need some studying as well, because all products are listed by their CN code, 
provided that the regulation has a product list. Hence, it is necessary to read these listings, which can be over 
100 pages long, with a CN code list next to it.  
 The previous GSP scheme, which was valid from 1998 to 2001, had a categorisation of products into 
four groups: very-sensitive, sensitive, semi-sensitive and non-sensitive. Products were categorised and listed 
by CN code in an annex of the regulation (no. 2820/98). The latest revision of the GSP scheme (no. 
2501/2001), which came into action January 1st 2002, consists of only two sensitivity categories (sensitive 
and non-sensitive). Although this resolution comes with a listing of products, it is very unclear whether it 
consists of just these two categories. EU and non-EU articles still refer to the categorisation of the prior regu-
lation. Furthermore, the list is considerably shorter which means that quite a lot of products are all of a 
sudden not covered by the GSP scheme (e.g. hams and alike). 
 The next step is to find out what the height of the tariff is, since the regulations merely determine the 
(ad-valorem) preferences. The EU does not list or mention the cur-rent (applied) rates. In order to find those 
rates one has to use other resources, such as AMAD or UNCTAD databases. 
 Which brings us to the next problem: different databases report different rates over different years, 
making it difficult to determine whether the tariff rate is still applicable. To make it even more complicated, 
they also present preferences on specific tariffs and on quota, although the EU regulations merely discuss ad 
valorem preferences. 
 So far we have only discussed tariff preferences and tariff rates, however, the rules of origin are an 
important part of every preference scheme as well. The general rules of origin can be found in the legal text 
of the specific regulation, at least for GSP, regulations for Cotonou are virtually impossible to find and EBA 
is an adaptation to the GSP scheme, which means that most rules of origin are mentioned in the GSP regula-
tion. More detailed (product specific) rules are listed, by CN code, in the Community Customs Code 
(regulation no. 1602/2000), covering over 70 pages. 
 As can be seen, the determination of a tariff rate, a tariff preference and whether a product meets the 
requirements of the rules of origin, is a complicated, time consuming task. Not just for researchers, but also 
for customs and producers in beneficiary countries, since they often lack the resources (e.g. a computer, 
internet access, etc.). 
 
Box 4.3 How to find the applicable tariff? 
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5. LDC exports to the EU before Everything But Arms 
 
 
 
What value does the EU EBA initiative have for least developed countries? To get a com-
plete answer to this question, one should compare production and trade patterns in LDCs 
before and after its implementation. This approach is followed in section 6. This section 
compares tariff schemes before and after EBA implementation, to get a first indication of 
EBA's impact on trade potential. 
 
Preference margins before EBA 
 
This section draws on a study by Bora et al. (2002), from which table 5.1 was reproduced. 
It shows the 1998 level of EU trade protection by product category and country. Numbers 
in the table may be interpreted as effective tariff rates in percentage of the value of the im-
ported product. Note that these are not true tariffs, as specific tariffs are excluded.  
 The table reports on LDCs Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and a 
group of LDCs from Sub-Sahara Africa. Of these, only Bangladesh is not an ACP country. 
If two tariff schemes apply, which is the case for the African LDCs, then the lowest tariff 
is reported. In 1998, LDC preferences were generally deeper than ACP preferences. The 
specification of sectors is most detailed in those products relevant to LDCs, including food 
and fibres. Manufactures and services have been aggregated in one sector each. The inter-
pretation of sectors is straightforward, except for 'other food products', which includes 
processed fish. 
 In 1998, LDCs were confronted with effective tariff barriers to EU markets for se-
lected sectors only. Practically all non-agricultural products and services saw tariffs 
exempted.1 There were three categories of agricultural protection in 1998, each of which 
stands to benefit differently from EBA's immediate elimination of tariff barrier for all agri-
cultural goods except rice, sugar and bananas. First, for oilseeds, forestry and fishing 
products, tariff barriers were nonexistent. EBA had no direct effect on market access, ex-
cept that, possibly, several Asian and African LDCs benefit from easier rules for fishing 
products. Second, before EBA there were high tariffs of 20 to 100% of value for paddy and 
processed rice, cereals, sugar and dairy. Immediate tariff reduction under EBA was largest 
percentage-wise for cereals (37%) and dairy (51%). These sectors stand to gain from the 
arrangement, but typically requirements for export have to be met. Third, before imple-
mentation of EBA low tariffs of fewer than 5% and substantial seasonal duties were levied 
on vegetables, fruit, nuts, livestock and animal products, other food products, beverages, 
tobacco, and vegetable oils and fat. Protection for meat and meat products varied. 
                                                     
1 In fact, just 3% of LDC exports to the EU were charged a tariff, according to Bora et al. (2002, p.18). They 
weighed tariff lines by trade flow. Their analysis thus excludes the trade impact of prohibitive tariffs. 
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 The expected impact of EBA on LDC export performance differs by sector. Provided 
here are preliminary expectations of selected sectors based on LDC exports to EU in 2000. 
The analysis follows down the rows of table 5.1, and matches tariff data to trade data pro-
vided in Appendix 2. The case of sugar is discussed in box 6.1. 
- Rice. All other things equal, the phaseout of tariffs on LDC rice between 2006 and 
2009 will create preference margins of over 60% compared to all competitors. Asian 
LDC exporters such as Bangladesh will earn substantial terms of trade rents, while 
supply constraints prevent large increase of market share on the EU market. In-
creased trade volume will occur mainly at the expense of traditional Asian exporting 
developing countries (Vietnam, China, India) whose GSP preferences erode. 
- Cereals. The direct gains to LDCs from cereal tariff reduction are minimal, as just 
half of one percent of cereal imports to the EU is of LDC origin. However, those Af-
rican LDCs able to produce a grain surplus may well gain from well-priced outlet 
opportunities on the EU market. 
- Vegetables, fruit and nuts. Over 40% of LDC exports to EU consist of these fresh 
products, so any tariff reduction should have significant impact. EBA eliminates av-
erage effective tariffs for LDC exports from 2.3% in 1998, plus substantial specific 
tariffs and seasonal duties. Remaining trade barriers are the entry prices for horticul-
tural products (see box 4.1). After implementation of EBA, the preference margin to 
LDCs with the tariffs of competitors increases up to almost 15% ad valorem. As a re-
sult, export potential for already substantial vegetable exporters such as Senegal, 
Ethiopia, Madagascar and Uganda increases. 
- Meat and meat products. Under EBA, the 14% share of meat and meat products in 
LDC exports to EU may increase somewhat. Tariff cuts for LDCs between 10 and 
20% are quite substantial, and may imply a threat to other developing country sup-
pliers. 
- Dairy. In 2000, LDC share in EU dairy imports was one hundredth of one percent. 
EBA eliminates a 51% tariff on this trade. With specific tariffs added, their may have 
been a situation of a prohibitive tariff. Because of the geographical distance of LDCs 
to the EU, it is unlikely that dairy trade will pick up under a zero tariff. 
- Beverages and tobacco. EBA reduces effective tariffs on major LDC export crops 
coffee, tea, tobacco and cocoa by 1.2%. Over 10% of coffee and tea imports are from 
LDC origin, and nearly 8% of tobacco. Main current LDC exporters of coffee, tea 
and tobacco are Uganda, Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania. In Africa, these are likely 
to take over trade from regional competitors such as Ivory Coast and Ghana, both 
ACP countries. 
 
 The expected gains in export potential may or may not materialise. One necessary 
condition for increased exports from the LDCs is that products comply with increasingly 
stringent safety and quality requirements on high-income food markets. 
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Table 5.1a EU: effective tariff rates in 1998, by sector and import country 
 
 
Sectors Austra- China Other Japan Rest of  Bang- Canada United Latin 
 lia  deve-  Asia ladesh  States America 
 New  loped      & Carrib- 
 Zealand        bean 
 
 
Paddy rice  65 65 65 65 65 62 65 65 65 
Cereals  60 45 49 45 49 37 59 46 46 
Vegetable, fruits, nuts  15 15 15 15 15 2 15 15 15 
Oil seeds  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugar  76 77 76 76 81 80 77 76 77 
Plant-based fibers  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other crops  3 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 
Livestock, animal products  2 7 8 33 7 5 13 18 6 
Forestry  2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 
Fishing  3 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 4 
Coal, oil, gas and minerals  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meat and meat products  84 32 35 61 35 13 85 65 65 
Vegetable oils and fats  11 11 11 11 11 0 11 11 11 
Dairy products  88 88 88 88 88 51 88 88 88 
Processed rice  87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Other food products  29 29 29 29 29 2 29 29 29 
Beverages and tobacco  8 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 
Textiles  1 10 4 9 8 0 9 9 6 
Wearing apparel  8 11 9 13 8 0 11 12 6 
Leather products  0 10 0 6 3 0 7 5 2 
Manufactures  2 5 0 5 2 0 2 3 1 
Services  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
The utilisation of preferences 
 
From the above, it follows that EBA in general brings modest tariff reductions only. This is 
understandable, given that LDCs had already been granted tariff and quota free access to 
the EU for many products. But exporters often fail to trade on the preference margin they 
are entitled to. Such a discrepancy between (potential) preference margins and the effect 
with which these are used is expressed by the so-called utilisation rate. Because of the 
costs of qualifying products for the preferential tariff, not all preferences are put to use. 
Utilisation is then normally below 100%. Unfortunately, little has been published on utili-
sation rates outside the UN institute for trade and development, UNCTAD. Between 1998 
and 2000, in many instances of LDC trade to Quad countries, less than 50% of eligible 
preferences were utilised (UNCTAD, 2001a). The utilisation rate for exports from least 
developed countries (ACP and non-ACP) to the EU in 1999 was estimated at less than one 
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third.1 For all developing country beneficiaries in the European Union market, UNCTAD 
estimates the utilisation rate at about 56% as against about 27% from the LDCs. 
 
 
Table 5.1b EU: effective tariff rates in 1998, by sector and import country 
 
 
Sectors Eastern- Middle North Malawi Tanza- Zambia Ugan- Rest of 19 
 Europe East Africa  nia  da Sub- ROW 
 and FSU      Sahara 
        Africa 
 
 
Paddy rice  65 65 65 62 62 62 62 62 65 
Cereals  47 51 51 37 37 37 37 37 47 
Vegetable, fruits, nuts  15 15 15 2 2 2 2 2 15 
Oil seeds  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugar  77 101 77 75 103 75 85 77 77 
Plant-based fibers  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other crops  3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Livestock, animal products  16 13 6 4 5 3 3 4 11 
Forestry  0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fishing  6 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Coal, oil, gas and minerals  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meat and meat products  38 46 75 10 10 9 19 14 55 
Vegetable oils and fats  11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Dairy products  88 88 88 51 51 51 51 51 88 
Processed rice  87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Other food products  29 29 29 3 2 2 2 2 29 
Beverages and tobacco  8 8 8 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Textiles  6 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Wearing apparel  7 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Leather products  5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Manufactures  2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Services  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Source: reproduced from Bora et al. (2002), table IV.A.4, rounded. Based on calculations of 1998 data on 
ad-valorem tariffs and calculated tariff equivalents of agricultural quotas only; specific tariffs are excluded. 
 
 
 Export products for which utilised preferences were low included textiles and cloth-
ing, fish and preparations of fruit and other plant material. Low utilisation rates should be 
attributed to the fact that procedures to receive the duty free access are too complicated. 
Many of these procedures are related to the difficulties of complying with rules of origin. 
The Bangladesh garment industry serves to illustrate the point. Between 1995 and 2000, 
rules of origin for garment imports under the EU GSP scheme were changed often, and re-
sulted in volatile utilisation rates for Bangladesh garment exporters (UNCTAD, 2001b). 
                                                     
1 Utilisation of preferences was higher for exports to other Quad countries, but in the late 1990s the prefer-
ence schemes of Canada, United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan also, covered far fewer products than the 
EU scheme. 
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By and large, these rules remain unchanged under the EBA-amendment. Thus, LDC ex-
porters, despite being eligible to improved preferential market access, frequently pay MFN 
tariffs to enter Quad markets. 
 Before EBA, tariff preferences granted by the EU covered 99% of all LDC trade, but 
the utilisation rate was below 50%. Hence, any initiative to increase EU market access for 
LDCs should addressed the practical constraints to market access. EBA is disappointing 
from that perspective (UNCTAD, 2001a). 
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6. Estimated effects of preferences in agricultural trade 
 
 
 
Developing countries that currently have preferential access to high-income markets may 
wish to defend their preferences in the upcoming Doha Round of negotiations under the 
WTO. However, one could also argue that these countries are better off with a multilateral 
reduction in MFN tariffs, even though their preferences would erode in the process of lib-
eralisation. The position that such countries take in the negotiations will naturally depend 
on their specific situation, but also on their interest: positions will differ whether interest is 
purely in trade, or in a broader concept of economic development. 
 For exporting countries, trade interests are driven by the maximisation of export sales 
revenues through the terms of trade. Economic development interests follow from overrid-
ing objectives such as long-term export growth and sustainable use of the natural resource 
base. Such development analyses therefore delve into relative prices, sectoral allocation 
and exchange rate changes (Bora et al., 2002:48), rather than direct trade benefits. 
 Also on the side of the country granting the preference there is a useful distinction to 
be made between a narrow and a broader perspective. In narrow terms, donor countries 
may evaluate the costs of a scheme by the tariff revenue foregone and the extent to which 
domestic products are replaced by imports. Taking the broader view, these elements are 
but part of the bigger picture, which the question arises whether the preference schemes 
contribute to the desired structure of the economy, or work against it. 
 
 
6.1 Trade perspective on preferential access to protected markets 
 
When a country is given the opportunity to export some of its products on a preferential 
tariff to a protected market, the following trade effects may occur: 
- increased volume of export to the protected market. Country groups achieving 10 
percent export growth from trade preferences appear to be major gainers; most indi-
vidual countries gain much less. Historical evidence about the trade impact of the 
preferential tariff schemes is not abundant. According to Pomfret (1997), there is 
conclusive evidence that GSP schemes up to the mid-1980s generated export growth 
in beneficiary countries. Gains were distributed unequally; most accrued to a select 
group of countries where domestic conditions were favourable to economic devel-
opment, such as South Korea and Taiwan. This pattern of distribution also shows in 
the current EBA-studies; 
- increased rents to exporters associated with a terms of trade advantage. Export reve-
nue gains are likely to increase with the strength of the improvement in the terms of 
trade with the importing country, but these may be concentrated in a small selection 
of products. These terms of trade advantages can be substantial in protected markets. 
See table 6.1 on the divergence of world prices and EU intervention prices. It reports, 
for a selection of agricultural goods important to low-income countries, the price 
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premium an exporter receives when he sells products at EU intervention prices in-
stead of world market prices. Note that the premium for rice, sugar and bananas 
- three products for which liberalisation under EBA is delayed - is among the largest; 
- reduced tariff revenue in the donor countries. When products from beneficiary coun-
tries replace other countries' exports on the donor market, there is an immediate loss 
to the donor of tariff revenues foregone. In the case of EBA-like access granted to 
LDCs, this has minor impact on EU welfare due to the small market share of LDC 
products. See Appendix 2 for detail on market shares. 
 
 
Table 6.1 EU price premium, 1999-2000 
 
 
Product Price (€/ton) Price 
  premium 
 EU World (%) 
 
 
Wheat  133 118 13 
Maize 140 92 52 
Pig meat 1,120 1,113 1 
Sheep Meat 3,333 1,476 126 
Whole Milk Powder 2,605 1,384 88 
Skimmed Milk Powder 2,055 1,419 45 
Butter 2,954 1,307 126 
Cheese 3,500 2,154 62 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2001c). 
 
 
6.2 Expected trade effects of EBA-like initiatives 
 
Recent ex-ante studies estimate export growth from EBA-like access to all Quad markets 
for all beneficiary countries in the range of 3 to 14% (see table 5.1).1 The results in ta-
ble 6.2 should, however, receive cautious interpretation. Each of the studies reports trade 
changes for a specific category of exports: Ianchovichina et al. (2000) report on non-oil 
exports of 37 least developed or highly indebted poor countries in Sub-Sahara Africa; Bora 
et al. (2002) report on worldwide LDC exports; Hoekman et al. (2001) report on LDC ex-
ports subject to peak tariffs at EU, US, Japan and Canada, the Quad markets. See also box 
4.2. 
 Each of the three studies estimates the impact of two trade preference schemes to 
LDCs: EBA-like access to the EU and similar unrestricted access to all Quad markets. 
There is consensus that the latter generates substantially stronger export increases than 
                                                     
1 Not reported here are results by Kerkelä et al. (2000), which compares trade and welfare of the African 
ACP countries under simulated zero-duty or GSP conditions. Under both scenarios their results do not com-
pare easily to those in table 5.1, either because the zero-duty tariff is reciprocal (i.e. tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on imports from EU to these countries are also removed) or because under GSP the remaining tariff 
barriers for agricultural goods are substantial. 
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EU's EBA only. The lion's share of this gain comes at the cost of other low-income export-
ers. On EU markets, African LDCs and African non-LDC developing countries show quite 
similar trade patterns - a finding that may be attributed to the Lomé/Cotonou arrangements 
for ACP countries - implying that diversion effects of European EBA will mainly draw 
trade away from African developing countries towards the African LDCs. 
 However, LDC's weight is too small for a substantial impact (Bora et al.; Ianchovi-
china et al.). Hoekman et al. (2001) also find substantial diversion of agricultural trade 
under the EBA access rules, from developing countries to LDCs in general. Regarding 
segments protected with peak tariffs specifically, a match to current LDC exports reveals 
that the fruit & vegetable sector in LDCs takes over trade from competitor developing 
countries. 
 Trade creation effects are small (especially in relative terms) with one exception; in 
the sugar market domestic products are prone to being crowded out by LDC or developing 
country products. More trade creation occurs when the other Quad countries follow the EU 
initiative for duty-free and quota-free access to LDC products. According to Hoekman et 
al. the countries that stand to gain most from unrestrained access are those where excess 
supply exists in products that were kept out of Quad markets by prohibitive tariffs or small 
TRQs. From that perspective relevant markets for LDCs are apparel and crops such as rice 
and groundnuts. Apparel products are levied a 15 to 20% tariff in Canada and the United 
States, and preferences margins for LDCs are minimal. Japan protects its rice market with 
peak tariffs of over 60% and small TRQs. For Bangladesh and other small textiles and 
clothing suppliers in Asia, export potential will likely increase. Likewise, several Sub-
Saharan countries may benefit from the opening in the Japanese tariff wall. However, the 
required export supply is currently to small for major welfare gains and enhancing capacity 
will draw resources away from industrial activity. In sum, removal, on preferential terms, 
of prohibitive tariff and non-tariff barriers on the grains market in Japan and the textiles 
and clothing market in Canada and the United States, may induce substantial trade creation 
from LDCs. 
 
 
6.3 Trade effects of preference erosion 
 
LDC trade preferences may lose part of their 'exclusiveness' in two ways. First, as a result 
of extending a preference scheme to more countries that produce similar goods. Hoekman 
et al., by proxy, apply unrestricted access to all countries in the GSP scheme. In such an 
experiment, any LDCs that are not least-cost supplier, loses market share to a more effi-
cient developing country. Fish and sugar are products for which trade shifts. Second, LDCs 
are also affected when MFN tariffs decrease. When the tariffs applicable to non-LDCs de-
crease, this causes the preferences of LDCs to erode. Both Ianchovichina et al. and 
Hoekman et al. (2001) estimate the trade effects of a decrease in MFN rates, by 25 and 5%, 
respectively. In all cases, starting point is EBA-like access to all Quad markets. The studies 
indicate that LDC exporters might lose trade to other low-income exporters due to prefer-
ence erosion, but the loss is not likely to be severe. It might cause redirection of substantial 
trade  flows  from one trade  partner to the other.  One would expect some welfare losses to  
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Table 6.2 LDC exports under preferential market access (change from base case) a) 
 
 
Scenario Data Change to  Impact relative to base case 
  base case 
   
  USD mln % 
 
 
Ianchovichina et al., 2000 
EU_EBA SSA37 world exports 513 3 Increase: plant fibre exports (23); no other  
    Effects 
Quad_EBA SSA37 world exports 2,543 14 Increased exports to Japan by 400% (mostly  
    cereals) at cost of EU exports; decreased: 
    crops(-12), leather, minerals 
Quad_EBA_MFN=75% SSA37 world exports 2,467 14 Increased exports to Japan by 280%, to EU 
    and to developing countries (cereals and 
    livestock mostly)  
Quad_EBA_CAP=Jap=0 SSA37 world exports 2,954 16 As Quad_EBA plus increased value of 
    cereal and meat exports 
Bora et al., 2002 
EU_EBA LDC world exports 386 1 Increased exports rice (paddy and proc- 
    essed), cereals and sugar to EU 
Quad_EBA LDC world exports 1,582 3 Increased SS-Africa grain exports to Japan 
    and apparel exports South Asia to USA; all 
    rice producers increase export to Japan 
Hoekman et al., 2001 
EU_EBA LDC world exports peak 185 1 Increased peak exports to EU by 37.5%, 
 products   mostly sugar products 
Quad_EBA LDC world exports peak 2,500 11 Potential export surge (in order of value) 
 products   clothing to Canada; clothing to US; sugar to 
    Japan; tobacco to US; sugar to EU. Trade 
    creation into Quad USD 132 million 
EU_GSP=EBA LDC world exports peak 5 1 LDC fish exports decrease; GSP peak  
 products   Exports to world increase by USD 18 
    billion, mostly sugar 
Quad_GSP=EBA LDC world exports peak 1,366 6 
 products 
EU_MFN=95% LDC world exports peak -47 -10 Most LDC peak exports to world (fish, 
 products   cereals) decrease to benefit of other 
    developing countries; LDC sugar exports 
    slightly up 
 
 
Under EU_EBA, all products of LDCs are granted duty-free and unlimited access to the EU market; under 
Quad_EBA these conditions apply to all Quad countries: US, EU, Canada and Japan; under EU_GSP=EBA, 
these conditions apply not only to LDCs, but all countries in the GSP scheme of the EU; likewise under 
Quad_GSP=EBA, but for all GSP countries in all Quad GSP schemes. Under Quad_EBA_MFN=x%, MFN 
tariffs are reduced to x percent of previous levels. 
a) Results from Hoekman et al. (2001) apply only to tariff peak products and indicate the change of exports 
under tariff lines that were over 15% before; simulations ignore existing quotas. Ianchovichina et al. (2000) 
results apply only to a sub-set of 37 Sub-Saharan LDCs. 
 
 
go along with such trade diversion, as LDC exporters are first replaced in the high-value 
markets. Below follows a discussion of welfare effects. 
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6.4 Economic development view on preferential access 
 
When assessing the value of trade preferences to the economic development of beneficiary 
countries, one should take more effects into account than the trade impact only. An analy-
sis of welfare effects may include the trade-distorting impact of preferential access on 
resource allocation and factor costs in the long run. Policies that deal with rents from pro-
longed access to producer rents in protective markets are crucial. Also, the consequences 
of various policy assumptions should be taken into account. 
 The section continues with a summary of three studies on welfare impact of preferen-
tial trade that make use of a computable economic model. These distinguish between 
terms-of-trade and allocation effects. The summary here follows three potential policies 
that may become relevant in the near future. One follows protectionist tendencies in agri-
cultural policy and a continuation of status quo with deep preferences to low-income 
countries. Two options go ahead of liberalised agricultural policies, one with focus on de-
creased subsidies and price intervention, and another with a focus on reduction of MFN 
tariffs. 
 
Option 1: Deep preferences under continued domestic agricultural policies 
 
See EU-EBA and Quad-EBA in table 5.1. Under EBA-like access to Quad markets, ex-
porters in beneficiary countries benefit mostly from openings in the Japanese agricultural 
markets and the apparel marketing Canada and US. The potential of earning terms of trade 
gains due to price premiums are substantial, especially in Japan. According to Bora et al. 
(2002), however, welfare gains follow mainly from improved allocation efficiency. This 
refers to the match between comparative advantages and factor use over sectors. When all 
Quad markets are opened up, there is more option for reallocation. Consequently, gains are 
bigger than under the EU EBA initiative only. 
 Both Ianchovichina et al. (pp. 17-18) and Bora et al. (p. 58) report that preferential 
access to EU and Japan agricultural markets draws resources in beneficiary countries away 
from non-tradable and manufacturing sectors towards the agricultural sector. Most relevant 
is whether the resources are used to build a viable agricultural processing sector, or purely 
used to facilitate exploitation of the natural resource stock. 
 
Option 2: Deep preferences under reduced domestic agricultural policies 
 
See Quad_EBA_CAP=Jap=0 in table 5.1. Under this scenario, the price premium for for-
eign producers drops dramatically, as will happen when EU common agricultural policy is 
reformed with a shift from intervention prices to farmer income support. This will reduce 
the opportunity to accumulate rents and invest in economic development. The case is also 
relevant for sugar trade, as is clear from box 6.1. When sugar trade with LDCs is liberal-
ised under EBA in 2009, EU prices are expected to be more in line with world prices. 
 In a footnote to their results, Ianchovichina et al. (2000) provide estimated trade 
benefits for beneficiary countries under completely eliminated subsidies on Japanese and 
EU agricultural production. The estimated gains, with EBA-like access to all Quad markets 
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as a base case, amount to a further USD 412 million. They report no evidence on welfare 
effects for LDCs, but these should be positive. 
 
Option 3: Multilateral tariff reduction 
 
In table 5.1, see Quad_EBA_MFN=x%. Hoekman et al. find that options that extend zero-
duty access to all developing countries or decrease MFN-tariff will by 5% entail much 
more cost to the donor countries. Ianchovichina et al. find that due to trade diversion half 
of the welfare gains for African countries under the cooperative Quad initiative would flow 
to other low-income countries, if these preferences were to erode due to a 25% cut in MFN 
tariffs. 
 Welfare impact in importing countries is composed of tariff revenue loss due to trade 
diversion and consumer surplus gain due to trade creation. Strength of the latter depends 
upon the notion whether the favourable country is the least-cost source for a particular 
product; if it is not, preferential trade will necessarily lead to lower welfare in the import-
ing country than under free trade (Ianchovichina et al., 2000:8). However, by the very 
small weight of LDCs in world trade, the initiatives results in little displacement of domes-
tic products by imports and in minor tariff revenue losses. Therefore, various reports agree 
with Hoekman et al. (2001, p. 727) that 'an immediate offer of duty free access (for LDC 
exports) is a low cost option for the Quad to offer' - costs in terms of rising Quad import 
coefficient. Table 6.3 provides a summary of all welfare and trade effects of a concerted to 
provide unrestricted access of LDC products to the markets of the Quad. 
 
 
 LDCs Quad 
Trade  
impact 
Export potential may grow by 3-13%, 
mostly due to broader range of products 
covered by preference of US and Canada 
(textiles and clothing) and Japan (rice and 
nuts) 
Individual countries affected by prohibitive 
tariffs may gain more if supply can expand 
Preference utilisation rate is unlikely to rise 
due to rules of origin and cumulating value-
added; thus limited rise of export to EU 
Minor tariff revenue losses and limited 
trade creation; except in Japan due to food 
imports 
EU (and ACP) sugar farmers and processors 
loose stake to LDC producers 
Trade versus aid argument for granting 
preferences 
 
Economic 
development 
1 or 2% welfare increase if export potential 
can be exploited 
Resources move into the agricultural sector, 
away from light manufactures. Short term 
gains, but when trade preferences erode 
transformation is more difficult. 
Impact of preference erosion is limited 
Positive effects on long term depend on al-
location of short term price rents and other 
temporary windfalls 
Possible depletion of natural resource stock 
with reallocation towards agricultural sector 
Low welfare cost, as a result of limited 
trade creation and efficiency loss  
Preferences on agricultural goods are linked 
with reform of agricultural policies, e.g. EU 
sugar and Japan rice 
Are preferences of use as a tool to influence 
supply side in developing countries to the 
benefit of donor country consumers? 
Figure 6.1 What to think of Quad-EBA? 
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Sugar is one of EU's most heavily protected agricultural products, with ad valorem tariffs of 75 to 103% for 
several LDCs (table 5.1). These high tariffs have to bridge the gap between the low-cost producing countries 
and the costs EU producers have to make to produce sugar, which can be over two or three times higher. 
High tariffs like these, hamper exports from low-cost producing countries like Mozambique and Brazil. 
 However, all preferential schemes of the EU (GSP, Cotonou and EBA) grant tariff preferences and/or 
tariff quota to their beneficiaries. Next to these schemes several bilateral arrangements and the Sugar Proto-
col, which consists of 17 countries, including 4 LDCs, regulate preferences for sugar products. The height of 
the preferences and the product coverage of all these schemes, arrangements and initiatives differ considera-
bly. The GSP scheme, for instance, grants much lower preferences and covers a smaller product range than 
the Cotonou Agreement. Everything But Arms initiative should give duty free access to all LDC exports, but 
sugar is excluded from liberalisation until 2006, after which tariffs will gradually be reduced and completely 
abolished by 2009. In the meantime a new quota for raw sugar will be established and expanded by 15% an-
nually, making it possible for LDCs to expand their exports under the preference-giving scheme. As can be 
seen, it is vital for an exporter or producer to know to which scheme he can apply, however difficult it might 
be to determine the tariff scheme, tariffs, preferences and requirements for products. 
 This jumble of tariffs and preferences is certainly not the only problem (developing) countries face, 
when exporting sugar products. The EU sugar policy hampers them as well. This policy, which was estab-
lished in 1967, is based on the principle of a fair income for producers and processors of raw sugar. This was 
done by the introduction of guaranteed prices, resulting in an incentive to produce more than necessary to 
meet internal demand. In order to stop the overproduction, the EU assigned production quota to each member 
state. However, the objected result was never met, with overproduction mounting to 7 million tonnes on a to-
tal production of 17 million in the year 2000. The biggest part of this overproduction is exported with export 
subsidies, in order to be able to guarantee a fair income for the producers. These subsidised exports are ex-
tremely competitive (cheap), which results in a white sugar market share of 40%, making the EU the biggest 
exporter in the world. Naturally, these distortions, mainly caused by the EU, have a negative effect on the ex-
ports of countries with a comparative advantage in sugar. 
 Another consequence of the sugar policy is that, despite its own overproduction, the EU imports sugar 
from developing countries (approximately 1.5 million tonnes in 2000). Since the EU already has an excess 
amount of sugar, it can be said that the imported sugar is directly exported (with subsidy) to the world, where 
it competes with sugar from the aforementioned developing countries.  
 In short, due to the complicated structure of the tariff schemes, the large amounts of subsidised ex-
ports from the EU and the re-export of sugar from developing countries, these countries are severely limited 
in their possibilities to boost their export and development. With the coming of the EBA initiative and the 
ongoing liberalisation of world trade, however, the EU and also the US have to review and adapt their sugar 
policies. This might give some possibilities for low-cost producing countries. 
Box 6.1 EU sugar trade policy 
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7. Conclusions 
 
 
 
The Everything But Arms (EBA) amendment to the preference scheme of the European 
Union (EU) will have limited effect on export potential and welfare in the least developed 
countries (LDCs). Before EBA, almost 100 percent of LDC products were covered under 
alternative preference schemes, but utilisation rates were quite low. As the amendment 
does little to simplify rules of origin and cumulation of value added, utilisation rates are 
not likely to rise. However, both the sugar sector and the fruit & vegetable sector in LDCs 
could benefit from the competitive edge that puts LDCs in a favourable trade position. Un-
der EBA, the preference margin of LDCs fruit and vegetable to other developing countries 
under the GSP scheme is over 10%; the preference over ACP countries is just 2%. If all 
countries in the Quad (EU, US, Canada and Japan) remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
LDCs, these countries gain access to market segments in Quad that were effectively barred 
before. This will result in trade creation and trade diversion with potential negative effects 
on producers in the Quad and other developing countries. The weight of LDCs in global 
trade, is however too small for substantial losses. 
 The current issue is whether there is a future to trade preferences for products from 
the South. It should be clear from the above that exports from the least developed countries 
to the Quad are sensitive to the trade preferences granted. Japan, Canada and the US could 
very well extend preferences at a small cost to domestic producers. While the utilisation 
rate of EU preferences should increase, the obligation for change lies with EU and LDCs 
alike. The EU would do well to simplify compliance with their rules of origin. From the 
side of LDCs, there is an obligation to improve on administrative practices, which some-
times induce trade at MFN tariffs where products are eligible to preferential rates. 
 When LDCs are granted deep preferences under continued domestic agricultural 
policies in the Quad, resources in LDCs will move towards the agricultural sector. Welfare 
in LDCs improves as exporters earn large price premiums. The return to these short-term 
rents depends heavily on the investment spending of these rents. That, at least, is the argu-
ment of Deaton (1999) for a case of temporarily booming commodity prices that has 
similar implications. On the long run, the rents will decrease as domestic agricultural poli-
cies in the Quad are cut back, as MFN tariffs decrease under further trade liberalisation, 
and as zero-tariff preferences are extended to peer developing countries. The studies re-
viewed in this report agree that, for LDCs, the trade diverting impact of extending 
preferences to non-LDCs is quite small. The negative effect of MFN tariff reductions is 
stronger, as a result of competition with lower-cost suppliers in non-LDC developing coun-
tries. Moreover, as Kerkelä et al. (2000) show, governments in several African countries 
would loose an important source of revenues under reciprocal liberalisation. If MFN tariffs 
and agricultural support in the Quad are reduced, it is necessary for LDCs that peer devel-
oping countries reduce tariff barriers too. As, among others, Van Meijl and Van Tongeren 
(2001) show, there are large potential gains to be expected for LDCs from liberalised 
South-South trade. 
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Appendix 1 Country list by tariff scheme 
GSP (179 landen) ACP (77 landen) LDC = EBA (49 landen)
Afghanistan  Afghanistan
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Angola  Angola Angola
Anguilla 
Antarctica 
Antigua and Barbuda Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina  
Armenia  
Aruba 
Azerbaijan  
Bahamas Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh  Bangladesh
Barbados Barbados 
Belarus 
Belize Belize 
Benin  Benin Benin
Bermuda 
Bhutan  Bhutan
Bolivia  
Botswana Botswana 
Bouvet Island 
Brazil 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
Brunei Darussalam 
Burkina Faso  Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Burundi  Burundi Burundi
Cambodia Cambodia
Cameroon Cameroon 
Cape Verde  Cape Verde Cape Verde
Cayman Islands 
Central African Republic  Central African Republic Central African Republic
Chad Chad Chad
Chile 
Christmas Islands 
Cocos Islands  
Colombia  
Comoros Comoros Comoros
Congo Congo 
Cook Islands Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba Cuba (niet ondertekend) 
Cyprus 
Democratic Republic of Congo  Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of Congo 
Djibouti  Djibouti Djibouti
Dominica Dominica 
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea  Equitorial Guinea Equitorial Guinea
Eritrea  Eritrea Eritrea
Ethiopia  Ethiopia Ethiopia
Falklands Islands 
Federated States of Micronesia Federated States of Micronesia
Fiji Fiji 
French Polynesia 
French Southern territories 
Gabon Gabon 
Gambia Gambia Gambia
Georgia 
Ghana Ghana 
Gibraltar 
Greenland  
Grenada Grenada 
Guam 
Guatemala  
Guinea  Guinea Guinea
Guinea-Bissau  Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau
Guyana Guyana 
Haiti  Haiti Haiti
Heard Island and McDonald Islands 
Honduras 
India  
Indonesia 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Iraq 
Jamaica Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
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Lesotho Lesotho Lesotho
Liberia Liberia Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Macao
Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar
Malawi Malawi Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives Maldives
Mali Mali Mali
Marshall Islands Marshall Islands
Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania
Mauritius Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia
Montserrat
Morocco
Mozambique Mozambique Mozambique
Myanmar (ontvangt geen hulp) Myanmar (ontvangt geen hulp)
Namibia Namibia
Nauru Nauru
Nepal Nepal
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
Nicaragua
Niger Niger Niger
Nigeria Nigeria
Niue Island Niue Island
Norfolk Island
Northern Mariana Islands
Oman
Pakistan
Palau Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
People's Republic of China
Peru
Philippines
Pitcairn
Qatar
Russian Federation
Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda
Samoa Samoa Samoa
Santa Helena
São Tomé and Príncipe Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal Senegal Senegal
Seychelles Seychellen
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Solomon Islands
Somalia Somalia Somalia
South Africa South Africa (EU RSA FTA)
South Georgia and South Sandwich Is.
Sri Lanka
St Kitts and Nevis St. Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia St. Lucia
St Pierre and Miquelon
St Vincent and Northern Grenadines St. Vincent and Grenadines
Sudan Sudan Sudan
Suriname Suriname
Swaziland Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania
Thailand
Togo Togo Togo
Tokelau Islands
Tonga Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Turks and Caicos Islands
Tuvalu Tuvalu Tuvalu
Uganda Uganda Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States Minor outlying islands  
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Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu Vanuatu Vanuatu
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Virgin Islands (British)
Virgin Islands (USA)
Wallis and Futuna
Yemen Yemen
Zambia Zambia Zambia
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe  
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Appendix 2 EU market shares of country groups: LDC, 
Non-ACP LDC and ACP 
Marktaandeel in EU 2000 (%) LDC Non-ACP LDC ACP Overlap LDC-ACP/LDC (%)
01 - Live animals 0,56 0,002 1,82 99,67
02 - Meat and edible meat offal 0,004 0,00 3,81 100
03 - Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and ot 8,5 1,96 11,22 76,9
04 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural ho 0,01 0,00 0,15 100
05 - Products of animal origin not elsewher 0,33 0,03 0,83 91,5
06 - Live trees and other plants; bulbs, root 3,79 0,02 23,61 99,59
07 - Edible vegetables and certain roots an 2,39 0,37 8,58 84,34
08 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus frui 0,83 0,02 8,60 97,49
09 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 11,58 0,23 22,77 98,03
10 - Cereals 0,44 0,002 2,98 99,56
11 - Products of the milling industry; malt; 0,10 0 0,62 100
12 - Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscell 1,50 0,03 2,28 98,24
13 - Lacs; gums, resins and other vegetabl 7,67 0,10 9,31 98,7
14 - Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable 2,55 0,02 4,29 99,31
15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and t 3,82 0,002 10,33 99,95
16 - Preparations of meat, fish or crustacea 2,30 0,63 15,04 72,48
17 - Sugars and sugar confectionery 4,56 0,18 56,25 95,97
18 - Cocoa and cocoa preparations 1,48 0,00 67,76 100
19 - Preparations of cereals, flour, starch o 0,03 0,003 0,50 89,18
20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 0,16 0,01 3,18 91,43
21 - Miscellaneous edible preparations 0,05 0,005 3,31 89,39
22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 0,03 0,004 9,63 83,68
23 - Residues and waste from the food ind 0,58 0,00 1,04 100
24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco su 7,72 0,21 17,69 97,32
29 - Organic chemicals 0,07 0,0005 0,48 99,35
35 - Albuminous substances; modified starc 0,13 0,0007 0,13 99,49
38 - Miscellaneous chemical products 0,01 0,001 0,11 88,98
56 - Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special 0,32 0,06 0,30 80,79
64 - Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts o 1,21 1,12 0,29 7,21
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramwa 0,16 0,02 0,16 85,25
25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering mat 0,93 0,0002 1,82 99,98
26 - Ores, slag and ash 6,24 0,001 6,99 99,98
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 0,88 0,02 4,67 97,73
40 - Rubber and articles thereof 0,15 0,02 1,76 86,67
44 - Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal 1,21 0,25 7,13 79,34
51 - Wool, fine and coarse animal hair; yarn and fab 1,4 1,39 0,05 0,71
52 - Cotton 5,37 0,03 8,98 99,44
55 - Man-made staple fibres 0,14 0,03 0,37 78,57
61 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, kni 9,1 8,34 3,44 8,35
62 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, no 5,43 5,06 1,18 6,81
63 - Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothi 1,51 1,45 0,22 3,97
71 - Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-pre 4,29 0,02 4,87 99,53
72 - Iron and steel 0,02 0,004 1,1 80
73 - Articles of iron or steel 0,02 0,004 0,04 80
74 - Copper and articles thereof 0,32 0,01 0,62 96,88
76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 0,15 0,003 2,35 98
81 - Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof 4,34 0 2,1 100
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Appendix 4 Analytics of trade preferences 
 
 
Figure A4.1 provides a graphical presentation of the effects for the three countries involved 
and the world market equilibrium, taken from Ianchovichina et al. (2000). It shows the 
general case where a developed country grants a discriminatory tariff preference to one 
foreign supplier, at the benefit of producers in the beneficiary developing country S and 
consumers in the importing country, and at the expense of producers in another developing 
country D that were suppliers before the granting of the selective preference. For simplicity 
of presentation, the traded product is not produced in the importing country and not con-
sumed in the other countries - say, it is an off-season horticultural product.1 
 
 
Figure A4.1 World supply and demand under preferential trade 
                                                     
1 See Bora et al. (2002) for a more extensive graphical presentation of a partial equilibrium analysis incorpo-
rating three countries and one product. They loosen up some important assumptions underlying figure A4.1: 
one is that product from different origin are perfect substitutes (i.e. completely exchangeable); another is that 
trade is not governed by a fixed world price. 
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 At the initial market equilibrium B, all products (X0T is the sum of the sum of the 
individual export supply curves Xs+t and Xd+t) enter the importing country under tariff t. 
The tariff is an ad valorem tariff, which raises the price by equal percentage at all prices, 
hence the constant difference between the tariff-inclusive supply curves (X+t) and tariff-
exclusive supply curves (X). Import demand M responds to price as normally, and is satis-
fied when it is met by export supply at price P0d.1 Countries S and D divide the import 
market along their respective favoured combinations of price and supply. As S is granted 
zero-duty access (t=0) and D is not, the latter loses market share even in an expanding im-
port market. Changes in the terms trade coordinate the shift; as S no longer pays tariff 
duties it receives a higher price than before and expands supply, D's prices are still at tariff-
inclusive height.2 Reduced average price expand import demand until equilibrium is met at 
C. In the importing country, consumers gain from the price decrease and displaced domes-
tic producers lose-the import demand curve only reveals the net effect, which is positive-
while public finance will have to cope with the drop in tariff (tax) revenues. 
 
                                                     
1 In the discussion on trade preferences under protective regime, the effects are discussed in the setting of an 
intervention price fixed above world market price. 
2 The assumption of upward-sloping export supply curves implies that the volume of imports of country has 
substantial effects on the total volume of export supply of the exporting countries. This may well be true for 
the beneficiary country, which, for political economics reasons will in general be a small exporter. But in the 
3-country partial setting, the third country may as well be a large exporter. As Bora et al. (2002) show, in 
case of a flat supply curve terms of trade effects are ruled out. 
